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Focus paper
Can we take online 
customer reviews 
or responses in 
social surveys at 
face value? If not, 
how should we 
“decode” them? How 
can questionnaires 
be designed to 
encourage effective 
communication when 
many people send 
information at the 
same time?
social 
surveys
Two recent research papers by 
Kohei Kawamura (Kawamura 
2011, 2013) look at these 
questions from a game theoretic 
perspective. In particular, he 
studied how the presence of 
multiple senders of information 
affects the reliability of 
communication. The framework 
he has developed is applicable 
to many situations of interest, 
such as online customer reviews 
(Amazon, TripAdvisor, etc.) 
and large social surveys (e.g. 
opinion surveys on Scottish 
independence). 
According to Kawamura, the 
most important feature of 
communication involving many 
senders of information is that 
they have to compete for 
attention of the audience and as 
a result they tend to be tempted 
to “exaggerate” their views. For 
example, for an online review a 
reviewer who likes a product only 
a little may nonetheless say “it 
is a fantastic product” and give 
five stars, while if he is slightly 
dissatisfied with the product, he 
may exaggerate in the opposite 
direction and say “total waste 
of money” and give one star. 
Indeed, it is well known that 
online customer reviews under 
a five star rating system have 
disproportionately large numbers 
of one and five stars. This is 
because when many individuals 
express their views at the same 
time (or on the same website), 
each one of them has only a tiny 
influence on the decision of the 
audience. 
Of course that is not the end 
of the story. Knowing that the 
senders of information have 
such incentive to exaggerate, 
the audience will take it into 
account and “discount” their 
messages. But in response, the 
senders of information have even 
more incentive to exaggerate. 
Kawamura rigorously analysed 
this “strategic” interaction and 
derived a Nash equilibrium of the 
communication game.
This Focus Paper is based on two 
papers by Kohei Kawamura:
i “Eliciting Information from a 
Large Population”, Journal of Public 
Economics, 103, 44-54, 2013. 
i “A Model of Public Consultation: 
Why is Binary Communication So 
Common?”, Economic Journal, 
121(553), 819-842, 2011.
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Designing and interpreting 
customer reviews
He found theoretically that in 
such communication, extreme 
messages (such as five star and 
one star reviews) are discounted 
more heavily, while “moderate” 
messages are regarded as 
trustworthy. As the number of 
senders increases, the incentive 
to exaggerate becomes stronger, 
and more people send extreme 
messages and consequently 
they have to be more heavily 
discounted. 
When the incentive to exaggerate 
becomes very strong, it maybe 
that the only way to communicate 
credibly is to use binary messages 
such as “Yes or No”, “Like or 
Dislike”, and “Agree and Disagree”. 
A salient feature of binary 
messages is that while they are 
coarse and able to carry less 
information than more elaborate 
messages, they do not give any 
opportunity for the senders to 
exaggerate (e.g. “how much” 
disagree or disagree). This is an 
important yet underappreciated 
advantage of simple binary 
questions. 
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The second suggestion is that, 
when we ask questions to multiple 
individuals, we may wish to 
use binary questions when the 
potential number of respondents 
is large. Not only is it simple to 
ask, answer and compile, binary 
questions and answers have the 
advantage that they do not require 
any adjustment for exaggeration. 
An interesting example of this is 
YouTube. Until a few years ago, 
YouTube had a five star rating 
system for each video clip, just as 
Amazon and TripAdvisor currently 
do. But now YouTube only offers 
two choices for rating, namely Like 
or Dislike. According to Kawamura 
this rating system is “robust” to any 
incentive to exaggerate, regardless 
of the number of reviewers. 
Kawamura’s study 
provides two practical 
suggestions
First, when we read online reviews 
or results from a social survey, 
we should consider how strong 
the respondents’ incentive to 
exaggerate would be. This would 
primarily depend on how many 
reviewers/respondents there are. 
When there are less of them, 
their messages/answers require 
less “discounting” even if they are 
extreme, since each of them has 
more influence on the audience 
and thus there is less incentive 
for the senders to exaggerate. 
Whereas, when the number of 
reviewers/respondents is large, 
it can make sense to discard 
information about the intensity of 
their opinions and focus instead 
on simply extrapolating how many 
agreed or disagreed, or liked or 
disliked.
“The most important feature 
of communication involving 
many senders of information 
is that they have to compete 
for attention of the audience 
and as a result they tend to 
be tempted to exaggerate 
their views.”
